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Ethnic Diversity and Social Solidarity in Canada

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Preliminary Analysis with the Canadian Election Studies

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A growing number of studies argue that there is a deep tension between ethnocultural diversity on the one hand and social solidarity on the other. We have also seen a backlash against multiculturalism policies in many countries, with governments placing greater emphasis on the integration of newcomers and minorities into the cultural mainstream. In effect, the very viability of a society which seeks to combine multiculturalism and social solidarity is being called into question.

This paper responds to these issues by focusing on various dimensions of the relationship between diversity and solidarity in Canada. We begin by distinguishing three forms of solidarity – democratic, civic and redistributive – each of which is an important component of social solidarity in its broadest sense. Then, drawing on recent Canadian Election Studies (CES), this paper (a) investigates the distribution and structure of Canadian attitudes on issues relating to democratic, civic and redistributive solidarity, and (b) explores relationships between support for solidarity and diversity. The results speak to a number of important debates in Canada and abroad. They also confirm the value of the CES in studies of political behaviour outside the electoral context.

The Solidarity/Diversity Debate

A growing international literature explores the impact of immigration and ethnic diversity on social solidarity. In general, this literature has been rather pessimistic. There is a widespread perception that ethnic and religious diversity has the potential to erode solidarity in each of our three domains. Indeed, some have argued that this negative effect is virtually inevitable. A number of large-scale cross-national studies starting in the early 1990s seemed to indicate that countries with high levels of ethnic diversity were more prone to a wide range of pathologies: they were more likely to have violent conflicts and more prone to civil war; less likely to develop into democracies; less likely to have redistributive welfare policies; had lower levels of trust; and so on.

More recent research has suggested that the relationship between diversity and solidarity is more contingent, and depends on the nature of the diversity and on the larger socio-economic context and political structures which contain and manage the diversity. These newer studies have challenged the idea that ethnically diverse societies are inherently more prone to civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Young 2002), or less likely to be democracies (Fish and Brooks 2004), or less likely to respect human rights; or less able to sustain social redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). In each case, the idea of a universal or inevitable tension between diversity and solidarity has been challenged.

While such findings should ease fears that diversity is always the enemy of solidarity, they provide no grounds for complacency. The potential for deep-seated tensions between ethnic groups is undeniable. The challenge is to explore the factors that mediate between ethnic diversity and solidarity, tipping the balance between inclusive or corrosive relationships in particular places and particular times.

The critical question thus becomes, what are the intervening factors that either generate or mitigate tensions between diversity and solidarity? It is here — at the interface

between diversity and solidarity — that further research is most needed. What are the factors that contribute to solidarity amidst diversity?

A number of mediating factors have been suggested in the literature, including economic, social and political factors. The impact of immigration on solidarity may depend, for example, on whether immigrants are seen as posing an economic threat, on whether there are shared associational and political forums for native-born and immigrants to meet and learn about each other; on whether a shared national identity is developed that encompasses both immigrants and native-born. Where policies and practices are put in place that reduce perceptions of economic threat, reduce social isolation, promote political participation, and build inclusive shared identities, then (it is hoped) the potentially corrosive effect of diversity can be mitigated, or indeed even reversed.

Yet these suggestions remain largely speculative. We have little firm evidence about the extent to which these different factors do mediate the impact of diversity on solidarity. Our aim in this paper is to take a first step towards contributing to this debate, by focusing in depth on the Canadian case, as it is captured in recent Canadian Election Studies. The pessimistic view about the impact of diversity on solidarity has often started from the American case, where racial divisions clearly have corroded solidarity, and then looked for comparable patterns in other countries. But Canada offers an important alternative narrative, with a very different history of both diversity and solidarity. While the Canadian social policy regime is less extensive than that in many northern European countries, it represents a more ambitious social role for the state than that in the US, with universal public health care and a more redistributive structure of income security programs. In addition, Canada is one of the most multicultural countries in the world (Fearon 2003). Over the last half century, the ethnic composition of the population has been transformed by changing patterns of immigration, and 20 percent of the people now living in Canada were born outside the country. Moreover, in contrast to some host countries whose immigrants come predominantly from one part of the world, creating a relatively homogeneous "Other," newcomers to Canada come from around the globe, contributing to a "diverse diversity" of ethnicities, races, and religions.

Sustaining solidarity while accommodating diversity has therefore been a central task in Canada for many years, and a variety of strategies have been employed in this regard. In that sense, Canada provides an important test case which can help us identify (a) which forms of solidarity are affected by diversity, and (b) which factors might mediate that relationship. We do not address the latter in the current paper; rather, for this preliminary work we focus on the former — on the relationship between solidarity and diversity, alongside other demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors. We see this as just a first step, however, in what we expect to be a much more extended consideration of a complex and interactive diversity-solidarity nexus.

Three Versions of Solidarity

In order to make progress on this issue we must first specify more precisely what we mean by "social solidarity". As noted earlier, we think it is useful to distinguish three different dimensions of this broad notion:

Democratic Solidarity: characterized by support for basic human rights and equalities and an inclusive approach to democratic decision-making, including acceptance of: equal participation of citizens from all backgrounds, tolerance for the political expression of diverse cultural views consistent with basic rights and equalities, and acceptance of compromises among legitimate contending interests.

Civic Solidarity: characterized by an openness to newcomers; mutual tolerance; acceptance of people of diverse ethnicities, languages and religions as legitimate members of the community, as belonging, as part of "us".

Redistributive Solidarity: characterized by support for redistribution towards the poor and vulnerable groups; support for the full access of people of all backgrounds, including newcomers, to core social programs; support for programs that recognize and accommodate the distinctive needs and identities of different ethnic groups.

We have focused on these three because they are, in our view, inherently valuable features of a society, and indeed are essential if a society is to be minimally decent and just. And yet none can be taken for granted. All three may require individuals to act against their initial inclinations and self-interest, or at least to exercise self-restraint in the pursuit of those interests and beliefs. All three forms of solidarity, therefore, must continually be nurtured.

A society with high levels of solidarity is often described as having "social cohesion" or "social integration", and indeed these terms are often as synonyms for solidarity. They all capture the same core ideas of mutual acceptance, democratic cooperation, and mutual support in times of need. But it is important to note that our definition of solidarity is narrower in focus than many other discussions. For example, many other discussions of social cohesion focus not only on civic, political and redistributive solidarity, but also on levels of interpersonal trust, strength of national identity, and levels of civil society participation (e.g., Soroka et al. 2008; Johnston et al. 2010). On these broader accounts, solidarity is not just about civic tolerance, commitment to a pluralistic democracy, and redistribution, but also about trusting your neighbour, feeling a sense of pride and belonging in one's country, and being an active participant in social and political life.

In our view, these additional dimensions of trust, identity and participation are certainly important, and may indeed be essential to ensuring a decent and just society. It may be impossible to achieve civic, political and redistributive solidarity without the right sorts of trust, identities and participation. For example, interpersonal trust and trust in government may contribute to tolerance, effective democratic governance, or support for redistribution; and a shared sense of national identity may increase social inclusiveness, enhance democratic governance or reinforce support for transfers to the poor.

But these relations are, we believe, conditional and contingent. Societies that exhibit high levels of trust, national pride or civic participation may not in fact be particularly tolerant of minorities, or particularly solicitous of the poor, or even particularly democratic. For this reason, we will eventually consider these as "intervening variables" or "mediating variables", in order to study their effects on the more foundational values of civic, political and redistributive solidarity. That is to say, we will treat trust, identity and participation as potential sources of social solidarity, rather than as elements of solidarity itself.

Our central question here, as noted above, is relatively simple: how does ethnic diversity impact on civic, democratic and redistributive solidarity in Canada? We have outlined three versions of social solidarity in this section, at least in theory. The following section attempts to connect theory and practice.

Solidarity in the CES

Our empirical work on these issues has thus far drawn on the Equality Security Community Survey (ESCS), a panel survey conducted in 2000-2002. The ESCS includes a good battery of questions on support for the welfare state, alongside questions on, for instance, immigration, networks, trust, and economic circumstances. Much of this is available in the Canadian Elections Studies (CES) as well. Indeed, where our three versions of solidarity are concerned, while the CES includes fewer questions on redistributive solidarity, it is the only existing survey in Canada that includes a good battery of questions on support for minority rights, a central component of what we are calling democratic solidarity. The CES thus offers a unique opportunity to compare and contrast support across all three types of solidarity.

Our work below relies on five composite measures of solidarity, two for each of democratic and civic solidarity and one for redistributive solidarity. The relevant questions are as follows:

Democratic Solidarity: Support for Minority Rights

For each statement below, please indicate if you strong agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. Please write the number that best reflects your opinion in the space at the right of each question. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.

For each statement... [as above]: Minority groups need special rights.

For each statement... [as above]: Political parties spend too much time catering to minorities.

Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion: Which is more important in a democratic society: (1) Letting the majority decide, or (2) Protecting the needs and rights of minorities?

Democratic Solidarity: Support for Dual Languages

For each statement... [as above]: We have gone too far in pushing bilingualism in this country.

For each statement... [as above]: Anglophones in Quebec are better treated than francophones in the rest of Canada.

For each statement... [as above]: Federal government services should be provided in only one language, French in Quebec and English in the rest of Canada.

Civic Solidarity: Support for Immigrants

Do you think canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now?

For each statement... [as above]: We should look after Canadians born in this country first and others second.

For each statement... [as above]: Immigrants make an important contribution to this country.

For each statement... [as above]: Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society.

Civic Solidarity: Tolerance

For each statement... [as above]: Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society

For each statement... [as above]: The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes

For each statement... [as above]: This country would have many fewer problems if there was more emphasis on traditional family values

Redistributive Solidarity

The government must do more to reduce the income gap between rich and poor Canadians.

Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion: The government should (1) See to it that everyone has a decent standard of living, or (2) Leave people to get ahead on their own.

For each statement... [as above]: The welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves.

For each statement... [as above]: If people really want work, they can find a job.

All of these questions, except for the ones on levels of immigration and reducing the income gap, are in the mailback portion of the 2000, 2004 and 2008 CES. (There was no mailback in 2006; and some but not all of these questions are available before 2000.) Of the two measures of democratic solidarity, we view the first — on minority rights — as the one that captures most directly this form of solidarity as we have described it above. For the preliminary work below, however, we also include a measure of support for bilingualism. Where civic solidarity is concerned, we use first a measure capturing support for immigrants, in terms of levels of immigration as well as attitudes about immigrants contributing and fitting in, and second a measure that captures "tolerance" for changing lifestyles, morals and values. The measure of redistributive solidarity is similar to the one we have used in the ESCS (Johnston et al. 2010); in this case it

combines support for redistribution generally speaking and attitudes about welfare recipients.

[Figure 1 about here]

Basic descriptives suggest that each of these five sets of variables hang together rather well, statistically-speaking. The items used for each measure are highly correlated, and Cronbach's alpha measures indicate that in almost all cases the composite measure is weakened with the exclusion of any single item.[1] We accordingly build each measure by (a) rescaling all questions so that the range is 0 to 1, and so that higher values indicate greater support for solidarity, (b) combining those questions, equally weighted, into a single indicator, and taking the average to produce composite indicators, all ranging, again, from 0 to 1. The results, combining all respondents from the 2000, 2004 and 2008 waves, are illustrated in Figure 1, which includes simple histograms showing the distribution of responses for each of these indicators alongside the means and standard deviations for each variable. The theoretical range is 0 to 1, though only for redistribution are there respondents who are wholly supportive (1 on all questions) or wholly unsupportive (0 on all questions). In all other cases the distribution of responses is clustered between about .2 and .7. Notably, only for redistributive solidarity is the modal respondent mostly supportive (a score of .5 or greater).

To what extent do the separate versions of solidarity that we specify here tap into some kind of generalized form of solidarity? There is certainly something common between them. The average inter-item correlation between all of our five measures of solidarity is .34. A principle-components factor analysis of the five composite measures produces a single factor, the loadings for which are relatively high: immigration, .69; tolerance, .66; minority rights, .81; bilingualism, .61; redistribution, .67. It is notable that minority rights loads so powerfully on this single factor; even so, 35% of the variance in minority rights is not captured by the factor, and the "uniqueness" of the other forms of solidarity ranges from 53% to 63%. There is some commonality, then, but some important differences as well. We will explore some of these differences, and at least one critical similarity, further in the regression models below.

Diversity in the CES

Before proceeding to regression analyses of our five measures of solidarity, we consider briefly the potential difficulties of using the CES for studies of ethnic minority status and context. We are, below, interested in how visible minority status and context affect support for the three versions of solidarity. Visible minorities have however tended to be poorly represented in CES surveys. This can be dealt with in statistical analysis partly by using survey weights, but those go only part-way in correcting for the fact that any single wave of the CES has historically included only about 100 visible minority respondents. Relatedly, CES surveys have tended to under-represent respondents in high-visible minority contexts. So analyses of the effects of ethnic context, i.e., percent

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[1] Cronbach's alphas are as follows: immigration, .68; tolerance, .63; minority rights, .57; bilingualism, .57; redistribution, .56. The one exception is for bilingualism, which shows a .03 improvement in the alpha with the exclusion of the question on Anglophones in Quebec.

visible minority in a respondents' neighbourhoods, tend to rely on a rather constrained distribution. The overall result is that CES survey analyses tend to rely on a sample that is disproportionally white, living in neighbourhoods that are disproportionally white.

[Table 1 about here]

We investigate the magnitude of the problem in Table 1, which shows first visible minorities as a percent of the Canadian population, first in the 2001 and 2006 Censuses, and then in the (unweighted) 2000, 2004, and 2008 surveys.[2] In each of 2000 and 2004, there is roughly a 10-point gap between visible minorities in the Canadian population and in the CES survey. That gap is reduced greatly in 2008, however. This is a consequence of a shift in the sampling procedure used by the Institute for Social Research (ISR, at York University) for the CES.[3] In short, up to 2004 ISR used 10 provincial "targets" for sampling; as of 2006, they used 13 targets: the provinces, but also Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. The result was a larger and more representative sample in the big cities (where the response rate tends to be comparatively low). In addition, 2008 was, for the first time since 1993, *not* a rolling-cross-sectional design. So there is an improvement in sampling, bolstered by the somewhat easier job of aiming for "targets" in a simple cross-sectional survey design.

This improvement in the 2008 CES is apparent when looking at ethnic contexts as well. "Neighbourhood-level" contextual data in the CES are generated in Table 1, and in analyses below, using census tract (CT) level data for all urban respondents, and census subdivision (CSD) data for all others.[4] Table 1 shows the distribution of visible minority context (% visible minority) for both CSDs and CTs, then, for both the 2001 and 2006 Censuses. The fourth column showing data for CTs as of 2006 shows, for instance, that the median Canadian lived in a neighbourhood that was about 13.1% visible minority; 25% of Canadian lived in neighbourhoods that had 4.5% or fewer visible minorities ; another 25% lived in neighbourhoods that were 31.6% visible minority or higher. In contrast, the median respondent in the 2004 CES lived in a neighbourhood that was just 4.0% visible minority, and the 75th percentile was just 18.0%. Put more succinctly: in 2006, one quarter of Canadians lived in neighbourhoods that were over 30% visible minority, but only about 12% of 2004 CES respondents lived in these neighbourhoods. The distribution is quite different for the 2008 CES, however. Here, the distribution of neighbourhood contexts for respondents (where % visible minority is concerned at least) matches much more closely the distribution in the Canadian population.

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[2] Forthcoming regression models combine these three CES surveys; so that each respondent observation is independent (an assumption of OLS regression), note that our 2008 sample includes only those respondents who are *not* panelists from the 2004 survey. 2006 panelists in the 2008 survey are included, since we do not include the 2006 survey on its own.

[3] We are grateful to David Northrup at ISR for pointing this out.

[4] Census tracts typically contain about 5000 people, but exist only in urban areas — more specifically, census metropolitan areas (CMAs). Census subdivisions vary more in size, but exist everywhere.

Our analyses focus on "visible minorities" as a group, and so we have considered just that group here. Work looking at other contextual variables, including subsets within the general "visible minority" category, might investigate the relationship between CES samples and the Canadian population further. For the meantime, however, we note that the CES may be increasingly capable of capturing variance in visible minority status and context. The 2000 and 2004 surveys are limited, to be sure, and we should keep this in mind in forthcoming analyses. But generally speaking there are reasons to be optimistic about the CES as a tool for investigating opinions across range of ethnic groups and contexts.

Analysis

We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis here to explore the relationship between each of our five measures of solidarity and two batteries of variables capturing ethnic and linguistic status and context. Where visible minorities are concerned, we include a dummy variable equal to one for visible minority respondents, a contextual variable capturing the percent of visible minorities in their neighbourhood, and an interaction between the two — allowing for visible minority context to affect visible minority and non-visible minority respondents differently. We use the same basic set-up for language, though in this case the contextual variable is somewhat different: we include a dummy variable equal to one for respondents' whose main language at home is French, a dummy variable equal to one for respondents living in Quebec, and an interaction between these two variables. (In each case, we capture what we have referred to elsewhere as "compositional" as well as "contextual" effects. See Johnston and Soroka 2001.)

For each measure of solidarity, then, a first model includes these six variables alongside a battery of what we regard as standard measures of individuals' socioeconomic situation — a model with which have referred to elsewhere (Johnston et al. 2010) as the "workhorse" model. These variables are as follows: Gender is a dummy variable, equal to one if respondent is female; age is a set of dummy variables for 30 to 49, 50 to 65, 66 and over, where the residual category is less than 30 years; education is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has more than a high school education; income is missing for a good number of respondents, so we fill in missing data through interpolation (details are available upon request); household economic situation is based on the following question: "Thinking about the past twelve months, has your household's economic situation improved, stayed about the same, or worsened?" A second model then adds party identification, to explore the ways in which different forms of solidarity are reflected in the Canadian party system. In each case, we combine respondents from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 surveys. (See note 1 above.) Results for all regressions are shown in Appendix Tables 1 through 3. The effects of context, drawn from the first model, are summarized in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here]

We begin with the results for our principal measure of democratic solidarity, support for minority rights, shown in the first columns of Table 2. The nexus of French-language status and linguistic context works roughly as we might expect here. First, note that

Francophones are more supportive of minority rights. French language status is a simple binary dummy variable, so the coefficient has a very direct interpretation: French-language respondents are on average, *ceteris paribus*, .03 points higher on this (0-1) scale of democratic solidarity. (Note that all other independent variables, listed in the Appendix tables, are either binary or rescaled from 0 to 1, so they too have very simple interpretations. The one exception is income, which is coded into deciles, 1 to 10, in each election year. This one way to deal with inflation over the eight-year period.)

The direct effect of Quebec residency is also positive and significant, though note that due to the interaction this captures the effect for non-Francophone respondents. That is, Anglophones and Allophones living in Quebec are (.03 points) more supportive of minority rights than those living outside Quebec. Given the negative interaction, Francophones within Quebec are basically unaffected by Quebec residency — they are more supportive than the average non-Francophone ROC respondent, but no more supportive, and perhaps even marginally less, than the average Anglophone/Allophone within Quebec.[5] (Note that these results are greatly reduced with the inclusion of partisanship in model 2, where heightened support for minority rights appears in both the Liberal and BQ variables. Results are shown in Appendix Table 1.)

The effects of Francophone status and Quebec residency are roughly similar for dual languages, where Francophones are more supportive, as are Anglophones and Allophone within Quebec. These variables matter much less for our measures of civic and redistributive solidarity. Francophones are marginally less supportive of immigrants, though having controlled for socioeconomic status the variable here just misses statistical significance; they are somewhat more supportive of what we have labelled "tolerance."

Returning to the first columns of Table 2, visible minorities too are more supportive of minority rights than non-visible minorities, though visible minority context has no discernible effect, for visible minorities or otherwise. Note that the interaction means that the effect of visible minority context for non-visible minorities is captured in the coefficient on line 2; and the effect of visible minority context for visible minorities is the combination of coefficients on lines 2 and 3. So, focusing first on effects for non-visible minorities, and looking across all five models in Table 2, it is notable that in no single case does visible minority context appear to have a negative effect on solidarity. In two cases, dual languages and tolerance, the effect is actually positive. This may partly be a consequence of self-selection — those non-visible-minorities choosing to live in more diverse areas may already be more solidaristic; with these data, we cannot really tell.[6] What is clear, however, is that our data provide no support for the proposition that diversity has a negative effect on majority support for solidarity.

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[5] Calculating this interactive effect is, in this OLS context, relatively simple: .032 (for Francophones) + .029 (for Quebec residency) - .040 (for Francophones in Quebec) = .021.

[6] One way to get at this is to look at the difference between those who have moved recently, and thus selected into diversity, and those who have not, and thus may have seen diversity increase around them. Only the 2004 CES includes a variable capturing time at current residence, however.

Where visible minorities are concerned, results are a little more complicated. Visible minorities are significantly more likely to support all forms of solidarity except "tolerance" — an interesting finding, and certainly one worth further consideration. Perhaps more importantly, however, to the extent that visible minority context matters to visible minorities themselves, the effect is negative. This is most evident in the model for redistributive solidarity, and note that the coefficients shown in Table 2 actually increase in magnitude with the inclusion of partisanship variables (see Appendix Table 3). These results point towards the possibility that visible minorities who select into high-visible minority neighbourhoods are less supportive of redistributive solidarity; though we can offer no obvious hypothesis for why this is the case.

That said, we should not get too carried away with the size of the negative coefficient. The direct effect of visible minority status is positive, so visible minority respondents are more supportive of redistribution to begin with. And whether the negative coefficient is large enough that it pulls visible minority support for redistribution below the levels for non-visible minorities is not clear from the coefficients. Figure 2, based on simulated values using the fully-specified (partisanship included) model, provides a more useful illustration of the effect. The figure shows predicted levels of support for redistribution across the interquartile range for visible minority context (from .013 to .163), for both visible minority and non-visible minority respondents. As Table 2 makes clear, there is no discernible effect of visible minority content for non-visible minorities. For visible minorities, the effect of context is to pull levels of support down, a little, to the non-visible minority average. The negative effect on visible minorities is still worthy of further investigation, to be sure. But these models suggest that the overall effect of diversity on social solidarity is by no means negative.

[Figure 2 about here]

There are a number of interesting findings nestled away in the Appendix tables; we will note just a few here. The most interesting difference across measures of solidarity in our view is captured in the effects of income: captured by a combination of income itself, and subjective assessments of one's economic situation, higher income tends to increase civic and democratic solidarity, but decrease redistributive solidarity. (Note that is true controlling for the effects of education, which we discuss below.) So the economic comfort that may make civic and democratic solidarity possible might also make income redistribution somewhat less appealing; alternatively, economic discontent might increase support for redistribution for purely self-serving reasons, while also decreasing a sense of solidarity in other domains.

Gender, age, and Francophone status also pull in different directions from one form of solidarity to another. Education quite clearly does not: this is the one factor that is significant and positive across the board. We have written elsewhere (Johnston et al. 2010) about the ways in which income and education pull against each other, at least where redistributive solidarity in concerned. The effects of the two appear to be reinforcing for other forms of solidarity. But clearly there is more work to be done teasing out the rather complex relationship between income, education, and solidarity. The other effects most stable across forms of solidarity are those for party identification. Support for solidarity is powerfully captured in the Canadian party system during this

2000-2008 period, with right-wing partisans showing markedly less support for solidarity than parties in the centre or on the left.

We regard these models just as a starting point — an exploration of the measures of solidarity available in the CES, following by a first test of the effects of ethnic and linguistic context on support for diversity. Even this preliminary work suggests some interesting facts about the the nature and structure of support for various forms of solidarity in Canada, however. We discuss these further below.

Conclusions

Our first observation, and perhaps the most relevant one given the theme of this workshop, is that the CES provides a valuable body of data for the study of various forms of social solidarity. Each of the three forms of solidarity that we lay out above — civic, democratic, and redistributive — has been well-represented in the CES mailback surveys. The CES thus provides a valuable opportunity to compare and contrast support for, as well as the drivers of, different forms of solidarity.

What has this first comparison told us? The most critical, and very clear, finding here is that ethnic diversity does not appear to have a marked negative effect on any form of solidarity. We have suggested elsewhere that diversity matters little — at least directly — to redistributive solidarity (Soroka et al. 2007). The same appears true for other forms of solidarity as well. Indeed, to the extent that we find effects of visible minority context here, they are positive. As we have noted, one possibility is that self-selection produces these positive coefficients — the "majority" people selecting into neighbourhoods that are diverse may tend to show high levels of support for various forms of solidarity. We cannot easily test that possibility in these data. But we can be confident that, where our future work on the factors that might mitigate the relationship between diversity and solidarity (e.g., trust, identity and participation) is concerned, the starting point is *not* a search for variables that reduce the obviously negative impact that diversity has on solidarity. These preliminary analyses suggest that there are few negative effects to begin with.

Of course, allowing for a variety of mediating variables may well reveal negative effects of diversity for certain subsets of the population — negative effects that may be masked in the rather simple estimations we rely on here. Analyses of intervening variables may similarly reveal negative effects. Consider our own past work finding that diversity has no direct impact on support for redistribution, but rather a negative effect on interpersonal trust, which then affects support for redistribution. (See Soroka et al. 2007.) Analysis above are telling, then, but simple, and limited, and clearly there is a good deal more work to be done. Even so, the results above do raise serious questions about fears that diversity is the enemy of solidarity. In the Canadian case, over the last eight years, there is very little evidence that this is the case.

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Figure 1. Distributions of Support for Solidarity

Figure 2. Ethnic Context and Support for Redistribution, for Visible Minority and Non-Visible Minority Respondents

Table 1. Visible Minorities in the Census and the CES

	2001 Census		2006 Census		CES		
	CSDs	CTs	CSDs	CTs	2000	2004	2008
% VM Population	13.5%		16.3%		3.4%	5.1%	12.9%

Distribution of % VM In Neighbourhood for all Respondents

10th percentile	0.4%	1.6%	0.7%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.9%
25th percentile	1.3%	5.2%	1.9%	4.5%	0.7%	1.0%	2.5%
50th percentile	6.1%	13.6%	7.5%	13.1%	2.5%	4.0%	10.4%
75th percentile	19.7%	35.0%	26.0%	31.6%	9.9%	18.0%	28.8%
90th percentile	42.8%	36.9%	46.9%	59.3%	24.2%	36.7%	57.4%

Census statistics are based on census subdivision (CSD) and census tract (CT) data files, where the distribution of context values is generated by weighting the % visible minority data by the population in each CSD or CT. CES statistics are based on basic descriptives for % visible minorities for all (unweighted) respondents in each wave, using CT data for all respondents in CTs and CSD data otherwise. 2008 CES respondents include only those *not* in the 2004 wave.

Table 2. Diversity & Solidarity

	Democratic		Civic		Redistributive
	Minority Rights	Dual Languages	Immigrants	Tolerance	
Visible Minority	.033** (.012)	.016 (.014)	.060** (.011)	-.007 (.012)	.050* (.022)
Prop. Visible Mino	.013 (.011)	.067** (.011)	.016 (.010)	.044** (.010)	.004 (.020)
interaction	.004 (.032)	-.083* (.039)	-.033 (.027)	-.011 (.029)	-.245**(.059)
French	.032** (.010)	.121** (.010)	-.019 (.010)	.023* (.010)	.016 (.018)
Quebec	.029** (.010)	.080** (.009)	.013 (.009)	.008 (.010)	.007 (.018)
interaction	-.040**(.015)	-.052**(.014)	-.011 (.014)	.007 (.014)	.040 (.026)

* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, based on model 1 using the combined 2000, 2004, and 2008 CES surveys. Full models are listed in Appendix Tables 1 through 3.

Appendix Table 1. Democratic Solidarity

	Minority Rights			Dual Languages			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Visible Minority	.033** (.012)	.039** (.011)	.016 (.014)	.009 (.014)
Prop. Visible Minority	.013 (.011)	.015 (.010)	.067** (.011)	.066** (.011)
interaction	.004 (.032)	-.047 (.030)	-.083* (.039)	-.095* (.039)
French	.032** (.010)	.023* (.010)	.121** (.010)	.114** (.010)
Quebec	.029** (.010)	.008 (.009)	.080** (.009)	.068** (.009)
interaction	-.040** (.015)	-.026 (.014)	-.052** (.014)	-.043** (.014)
Immigrant	.003 (.005)	-.003 (.004)	.008 (.005)	.009 (.005)
Income (imputed)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.000 (.001)	.000 (.001)
Education (more than HS)	.040** (.004)	.036** (.003)	.022** (.004)	.020** (.004)
Age (30-49)	-.005 (.006)	-.006 (.005)	-.022** (.006)	-.022** (.006)
Age (50-64)	.000 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.026** (.006)	-.027** (.006)
Age (65+)	.010 (.006)	.007 (.006)	-.025** (.006)	-.027** (.006)
Female	.007* (.003)	.005 (.003)	.015** (.003)	.013** (.003)
Work: Unemployed	.020* (.009)	.017 (.009)	.030** (.009)	.029** (.009)
Work: Other	.018** (.005)	.013** (.004)	.002 (.004)	.001 (.004)
Union Member	.011** (.004)	.002 (.004)	-.008* (.004)	-.010* (.004)
Economic Situation Worse	-.020** (.004)	-.021** (.004)	-.018** (.004)	-.019** (.004)
PID: Liberal		.024** (.004)		.012** (.004)
PID: Conservative		-.053** (.004)		-.030** (.005)
PID: NDP		.075** (.006)		.018** (.006)
PID: Reform		-.025** (.008)		-.043** (.008)
PID: BQ		.026** (.007)		.010 (.007)
Constant	.417** (.007)	.427** (.007)	.373** (.007)	.381** (.008)
N	4457	4457	3842	3842
Rsq	.053	.158	.322	.343
Adj Rsq	.049	.154	.319	.339

* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, based on the combined 2000, 2004, and 2008 CES surveys.

Appendix Table 2. Civic Solidarity

	Support for Immigrants		Tolerance	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Visible Minority	.060** (.011)	.062** (.011)	-.007 (.012)	-.013 (.012)
Prop. Visible Minority	.016 (.010)	.019* (.010)	.044** (.010)	.047** (.010)
interaction	-.033 (.027)	-.055* (.026)	-.011 (.029)	-.022 (.028)
French	-.019 (.010)	-.024* (.010)	.023* (.010)	.018 (.010)
Quebec	.013 (.009)	.001 (.009)	.008 (.010)	-.006 (.009)
interaction	-.011 (.014)	-.004 (.014)	.007 (.014)	.011 (.014)
Immigrant	.039** (.004)	.036** (.004)	.009* (.005)	.005 (.004)
Income (imputed)	.002** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.004** (.001)	.004** (.001)
Education (more than HS)	.061** (.003)	.058** (.003)	.033** (.004)	.031** (.003)
Age (30-49)	.007 (.005)	.007 (.005)	-.041** (.005)	-.040** (.005)
Age (50-64)	.017** (.005)	.016** (.005)	-.058** (.006)	-.058** (.005)
Age (65+)	.021** (.006)	.022** (.006)	-.079** (.006)	-.076** (.006)
Female	-.008* (.003)	-.009** (.003)	-.011** (.003)	-.012** (.003)
Work: Unemployed	-.028** (.009)	-.028** (.009)	.035** (.009)	.030** (.009)
Work: Other	.015** (.004)	.013** (.004)	.006 (.004)	.003 (.004)
Union Member	-.003 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	.001 (.004)	-.004 (.004)
Economic Situation Worse	-.027** (.004)	-.028** (.004)	-.005 (.004)	-.006 (.004)
PID: Liberal		.010* (.004)		.004 (.004)
PID: Conservative		-.037** (.004)		-.050** (.004)
PID: NDP		.042** (.006)		.049** (.006)
PID: Reform		-.007 (.008)		-.018* (.008)
PID: BQ		.016* (.007)		.023** (.007)
Constant	.388** (.007)	.393** (.007)	.385** (.007)	.395** (.007)
N	4569	4569	4794	4794
Rsq	.164	.201	.129	.183
Adj Rsq	.161	.197	.126	.180

* p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, based on the combined 2000, 2004, and 2008 CES surveys.

Appendix Table 3. Redistributive Solidarity

	Model 1	Model 2
Visible Minority	.050* (.022)	.056** (.021)
Prop. Visible Minority	.004 (.020)	.014 (.019)
interaction	-.245** (.059)	-.322** (.057)
French	.016 (.018)	.003 (.017)
Quebec	.007 (.018)	-.024 (.017)
interaction	.040 (.026)	.051* (.026)
Immigrant	.017 (.009)	.007 (.008)
Income (imputed)	-.008** (.001)	-.008** (.001)
Education (more than HS)	.042** (.007)	.037** (.006)
Age (30-49)	.002 (.010)	.005 (.010)
Age (50-64)	.015 (.010)	.012 (.010)
Age (65+)	-.013 (.012)	-.009 (.011)
Female	.039** (.006)	.035** (.006)
Work: Unemployed	.040* (.016)	.039* (.016)
Work: Other	.028** (.008)	.024** (.008)
Union Member	.038** (.007)	.028** (.007)
Economic Situation Worse	.020** (.007)	.018** (.007)
PID: Liberal		.015* (.007)
PID: Conservative		-.099** (.008)
PID: NDP		.119** (.011)
PID: Reform		-.064** (.014)
PID: BQ		.052** (.013)
Constant	.523** (.013)	.540** (.013)
N	5004	5004
Rsq	.060	.137
Adj Rsq	.056	.133

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, based on the combined 2000, 2004, and 2008 CES surveys.